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Conspiracy theories have long been a facet of American society, many of which have targeted 
politicians and the government. The presence of QAnon has emerged as perhaps the most 
popular and dangerous conspiracy theory in modern U.S. history since its origination in 2017. 
Over recent months, the conspiracy theory has gained vast notoriety and publicity, increasing 
the spread of disinformation. QAnon is no longer a traditional conspiracy theory that ties 
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Abstract 
This report demonstrates the overarching need for additional exploration and 
intervention of conspiracy-based radicalization as the QAnon conspiracy theory 
continues to grow. Strong pillars of belief among the QAnon movement, coupled 
with the spread of disinformation online, has exacerbated the familiarity and 
willingness to accept the rhetoric within mainstream media and culture. This 
report examines the evolution, ideologies, and paradigms associated with 
supporters of QAnon to better understand the most influential mechanisms of 
modern conspiracy-based radicalization. Utilizing a France-based digital 
disinformation platform known as Storyzy, the authors hypothesize that 
disinformation campaigns, coupled with the Internet and social media, has greatly 
enabled the unprecedented global effect of QAnon. The authors explored the 
potential of several survey methods to seek insights from QAnon followers on 
Gab and Telegram. Additionally, the authors discerned various implications of 
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together a small pool of individuals based on misguided beliefs; it has sharply evolved into a 
radical cult-like movement that does not strictly operate in an online space. Not only has the 
U.S.-based conspiracy gained global traction, but QAnon followers have now mobilized 
offline committing real acts of violence. QAnon and its followers have become one of the 
largest spreaders of disinformation online, worsening an already polarized American public.  
In 2019, the FBI released an unclassified document warning of the dangers posed by 
QAnon, highlighting the likelihood of inspiring and motivating domestic extremist violence 
(Winter, 2019). QAnon has since erupted and raised security concerns across the globe. 
Recent literature has also elucidated that a strong conspiracy mentality increases the 
likelihood of violent extremist behavior, especially in those individuals who exhibit low self-
control, low regard for the law, and high self-efficacy (Rottweiler & Gill, 2020; Rousis, 
2018). Thus, the rapid spread of QAnon has spiraled from simple disinformation largely 
distributed online to a real-world offline political violence threat. Taking this literature into 
consideration with the rising indoctrination of QAnon followers, this article seeks to answer 
the following research question: What are the mechanisms by which the QAnon conspiracy 
has been able to evolve from an internet board to one of the largest polarizing and radicalizing 
belief systems in the U.S. and abroad? The following report will analyze the history, 
evolution, and potential future implications of QAnon to add to the growing understanding of 
conspiracy-based radicalization. This report utilized open-source intelligence (OSINT) and 
surveys of QAnon followers to seek insights into QAnon’s accelerating global reach and how 




How Conspiracy Theories Rise 
Conspiracy theories have been used for decades as a coping mechanism during times 
of chaos to help cope during unprecedented times (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017, p.327). 
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be adopted as a means of comprehending complex events and often single out enemies, 
despite the theories being false or based on unsubstantiated claims (Hofstadter, 1966; van 
Prooijen & Douglas, 2017, p.327). Extremists tend to cling to rhetoric that amplifies their 
beliefs and provides a sense of direction despite counter rhetoric that may be circulating in 
society. Following the 9/11 attacks, for example, conspiracies surfaced suggesting that the 
attacks were deployed from within the country and that the U.S. government’s failure in 
preventing the attack was deliberate (van Prooijen and Douglas, 2017, p.326). This hypothesis 
was accelerated by the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, whereby conspiracy theorists claim 
an enemy was created by politicians to justify the invasion of those countries.  
Mistrust in government and legislative institutions often serves as a push factor that 
influences the formation and spread of conspiracy theories. As can be seen through QAnon’s 
agenda, their primary campaign revolves around their perceived evil of the current leaders of 
the U.S. government. Widespread support of conspiracy theories, especially by those in 
political positions, can affect political opponents and the institutions they represent, adding to 
the legitimacy and credibility of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theorists often focus on ideas 
and individuals that are well-known and influential in mainstream culture.  
While conspiracy-thinking and violent extremist ideologies remain different categories 
of extreme thoughts and behavior, they can intersect nevertheless (Frennet & Joost, 2021). 
This intersection can raise threat concerns when the conspiracy asserts that “(1) one group is 
superior to another, (2) one group is under attack by another group, or (3) the threat is 
apocalyptic (existential threat) in nature” (Frennet & Joost, 2021). The QAnon conspiracy 
ticks off each of these three concerns, presenting the need to understand modern conspiracy-
based radicalization and effective means to counter conspiracy narratives and de-radicalize 
adherents.  
 
Psychological Factors and Conspiracy Followings 
A study by van Prooijen (2015) highlights the idea that “self-uncertainty and 
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more suspicious and skeptical about social events. Individuals who are highly susceptible to 
violent extremism, for example, often experience issues with self-worth, sense of belonging 
and self-esteem; they are likely to not only question themselves, but their surroundings as 
well. Those who seek a sense of belonging that they are not adequately feeling in their 
everyday lives have been more inclined to seek it elsewhere, such as through terrorist 
organizations, hate groups, gangs, and conspiracy theory supporters (Borum, 2004). 
Individuals with self-uncertainty have strong attitudes towards social issues and identify more 
strongly with important groups, enabling themselves to accept conspiracy theory rhetoric like 
QAnon (van Prooijen, 2015).  
Understanding critical psychological aspects that explain why conspiracy theories 
manifest and disperse is key when attempting to dissuade believers, especially within the 
extremist community. Group polarization and groupthink represent two psychological 
phenomena that can lead to the escalation of conspiracy theories, violent extremism, and 
terrorism. Group polarization refers to the tendencies of a group of people to make decisions 
based on what they believe or see others doing (Sunstein, 1999). Group polarization generally 
leads to emboldening ideologies due to being immersed in a community of like-minded 
individuals (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p.422).  
Groupthink occurs when group members make decisions or behave in a manner more 
extreme than they naturally would, often due to the need to belong and fit group norms (Janis, 
1991). Groupthink leads to individuals effectively losing their ability to be open to alternative 
lines of thinking, including counternarratives and all evidence to the contrary of their beliefs 
(Janis, 1991). This is commonplace within extremist communities, as individuals generally 
tend to follow the herd and lose their sense of autonomy. Group polarization can emerge 
computationally by simply assuming individuals hold opinions on a multitude of topics 
(Mueller & Tan, 2018; Olbrich, 2019, as cited by Turner & Smaldino, 2020). This can be seen 
in QAnon supporters’ behavior, often filled with resentment and distrust of political elites.. 
Group polarization and groupthink can often lead to unhealthy or dangerous behaviors, 
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teenagers are likely to engage in these behaviors if they see others doing the same (Sunstein, 
1999, p.5). In terms of violent extremism and conspiracy narratives, however, groupthink 
dynamics often rely on a perceived enemy, creating an “us” versus “them” mentality (Frennet 
& Joost, 2021; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). At-risk individuals, such as those engaging 
in unhealthy behaviors, are much more likely to resort to acts of extremism due to their 
environment and upbringing. These phenomena are particularly important within the realm of 
terrorism today, as there has been a steady increase of polarization and radicalization within 
the United States in recent years (Horgan, 2021). While conspiracy theories may not have 
mass radicalizing effects, they are extremely effective at leading to increased polarization 
within societies (Horgan, 2021). Further polarization with a strong us versus them mentality, 
coupled with the right psychosocial factors or push/pull factors, may increase the likelihood 
of individuals plotting a violent act. While few studies have analyzed the full impact of 
groupthink in violent extremist contexts, it is necessary to consider these factors when 
analyzing the rise of conspiracy theories. Alternative social media platforms analyzed in this 
report provide online environments that propagate group polarization and groupthink that 
increase the spread and acceptance of disinformation.  
 
Origins of QAnon 
QAnon is a backless set of conspiracy beliefs, with the main pillar alleging a cabal of 
deep state Satan-worshipping and paedophile politicians is taking over the government 
(Zadrozny & Collins, 2018). Followers believe that QAnon is not one singular individual, but 
a small group of high-ranking military and intelligence officials with Q-level security 
clearances working directly with former President Trump ("About-Q", n.d.). The ideology 
claiming that elites are controlling the United States government has circulated among QAnon 
since the 2016 Presidential Election.  
During this time, various right-wing influencers and news outlets extensively covered 
the presidential campaign of Hilary Clinton. Wikileaks released several emails from Hillary 
Clinton’s campaign manager, John Podesta, some of which mentioned a prominent 
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shared across alternative social media platforms, such as 4chan and Reddit, many began 
raising false accusations that the Clinton emails were written in code and alluding to a child 
sex trafficking ring within Comet Ping Pong (Fisher et al., 2016). Despite lack of any 
evidence, the rumors convinced a 29-year-old North Carolina man to drive to Washington 
D.C. to investigate the shop on his own, ultimately firing an AR-15 in the restaurant 
(Kennedy, 2017). While rumors about the restaurant have been debunked, the incident ignited 
a wave of believers who contend something more sinister is happening within the depths of 
the U.S. government. Thus, pizzagate became a predecessor to the much larger conspiracy 
beliefs of QAnon (Amarasingam & Argentino, 2020). 
QAnon believers also draw from anti-Semitic literature and conspiracy theories. For 
example, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, an anti-Semitic propaganda book, suggests that 
Jews are continuously trying to control and implement a world-ruling cabal (Sales, 2020). The 
book is often used to justify anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs (Sales, 2020). This rhetoric has 
been consistent with the QAnon conspiracy. Further, QAnon also dates back to a more 
modernized approach of blood libel or beliefs that cabal members extract “the chemical 
adrenochrome from the blood of their child victims” for ingestion, which will help extend 
their lifespan (Lavin, 2020). Those who believe in these particular pillars of QAnon are 
associated with the most extreme spectrum of the conspiracy narrative. 
The ideologies that QAnon eventually emerged from first began to appear during the 
2016 Presidential Election and Pizzagate incident. On October 28th, 2017, the screenname of 
QAnon created a post that was published on the message board 4chan, alleging that Hillary 
Clinton would be extradited and arrested for her involvement in a child sex trafficking ring 
(Intelligence Drops, 2017). This post was the very first “Q Drop.” The post depicted below in 
Figure 1 generated significant noise online in the form of 4,000 additional posts discussing the 
drop (Robb, 2017). The identity behind the screen name QAnon established legitimacy among 
supporters by claiming to possess top security clearance and an affiliation with the 
government “who knew the truth about the secret struggle for power between Trump and the 
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Source: Intelligence Drops, 2017. 
 
The capitalized “Q” in the QAnon name is most likely linked to “Q Clearance,” which 
is a top-secret category of federal security clearances in the United States, with “A” referring 
to an “Anonymous” user with Q-level security clearance (Wendling, 2021). This linkage, 
however, has not generated much attention by previous studies. Q-level is a very particular 
type of clearance granted to the employees of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), among others (U.S. NRC, 2020; Departmental 
Personnel Security FAQs, n.d.). The individual or group of individuals claiming to be QAnon 
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While QAnon emerged on 4chan, a message-board consisting of threads and related 
comments, the movement migrated to 8chan in November 2017 after encountering various 
censorship and limitations in posting capabilities (“Absolutely everything,” 2014). 8chan has 
been linked to various violent extremist attacks with several attackers posting their manifestos 
on the platform. As a result, 8chan was shut down, forcing the platform to transition and 
rebrand itself, now known as 8kun (Zadrozny & Collins, 2018).  
8kun is currently hosted by an Ireland-based company known as Spartan Hoswhich 
that provides the service with protection from cybersecurity attacks to ensure it always 
remains accessible and available to the user (Ray, 2020). Additionally, it is also connected to 
a Russian protection service that monitors the network for potential cyber intrusion attacks. 
This increased level of security ensures continuous use and minimal disruption, allowing all 
users - including QAnon supporters - to push their rhetoric to new heights.  
To distinguish itself from other anonymous users, QAnon relies on a “tripcode” to 
disguise the rhetoric being used and communicate only to dedicated supporters of QAnon that 
would be able to decipher the text, as shown in Figure 2 (Griffin, 2020). The meaning is often 
indiscernible to the general public, and only those close to QAnon have the decryption key. 
 
Figure 2. QAnon code possessing an encrypted meaning and executable instruction. 
 
Source: Griffin, 2020. 
 
QAnon’s narrative on social media is presented in a way that allows the reader to 
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others. They often consist of leading questions that direct the user to the “truth” which 
supports the goals and ideologies of QAnon. Followers of QAnon have deduced a particular 
set of goals of the movement. According to the QAnon Alerts Website, the objectives of 
QAnon are: 
 
A. “A massive information dissemination program meant to: 
a. Expose massive global corruption and conspiracy to the people. 
b. Cause the people to research further to aid further in their “great awakening.” 
B. Root out corruption, fraud, and human rights violations worldwide. 
C. Return the Republic of the United States to the Constitutional rule of law and also 
return “the People” worldwide to their own rule. 
 
In short, the QAnon operation is the greatest criminal sting and anti-treason/sedition event 
in world history ("About-Q", n.d.).” 
 
The evolution from a conspiracy on an online message board to the offline shooting at 
Comet Ping-Pong was the beginning of a much larger disinformation and security crisis. The 
misguided objectives defined by QAnon raise real-time national security concerns, especially 
as QAnon continues to indoctrinate new followers. These objectives are not simply to raise 
harmless thought-provoking conspiracy discussions online, but also serve to deliberately 
undermine the current governing structure in the U.S. Initial evidence suggests that QAnon 
has influenced the violence that occurred at the U.S. Capitol building on January 6th, 2021. 
The Soufan Center has released a working database titled “Mapping Insecurity: Tracking 
Domestic Violent Extremism,” which reports on individuals that have been identified in 
connection to the Capitol Insurrection and is largely based on the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) records. This interactive tracker includes references to the arrest reports for many of 
those who have been connected to the Capitol building violence, many of whom have been 
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not every individual involved in the insurrection has been arrested and, for those that have, 
not everyone is an adherent of QAnon, there have been several examples of QAnon followers 
who participated in the January 6th events, such as Jacob Chansley (also known as the QAnon 
Shaman), Douglas Jensen, Cleveland Meredith Jr., Rosanne Boyland, and Ashli Babbitt 
(Rubin et al., 2021). The Capitol Insurrection highlights how this conspiracy ideology has 
evolved from online activity to a driver of one of the most recent attacks on a democratic 
institution in the United States, resulting in the deaths of 5 Americans.  
Further, with the inauguration of President Joe Biden, the future of QAnon remains 
contentious, as so much of the movement was based on then President Trump’s success and 
power in office. According to QAnon’s belief system, the election of President Joe Biden was 
never supposed to happen (Sabin, 2021). Some followers therefore felt they were misguided 
by QAnon’s false predictions, which may cause some fracturing in the movement 
(“IntelBrief,” 2021). However, many QAnon supporters may be vulnerable to recruitment by 
other violent non-state actors (“IntelBrief,” 2021).  
Recent reports suggest that many of the most ardent QAnon supporters have been 
alluding to March 4th, 2021 (dubbed “the Storm”) as the final day when the cabal of deep 
state paedophiles is finally defeated and when former President Donald Trump will assume a 
second term (Feeld, 2021; “IntelBrief,” 2021). Until the ratification of the twentieth 
Amendment to the U.S. constitution in 1933, the U.S. presidents used to be inaugurated on 
March 4th, hence the belief that former President Trump will become the 19th President on 
March 4th, 2021. The belief echoes that of the “sovereign citizen” movement propagating that 
there has been no legitimate president in the United States since the 18th President Ulysses S. 
Grant—and therefore no legitimate country since (Feeld, 2021; “IntelBrief,” 2021). This 
narrative has caused some measurable impacts, such as a dramatic raise of hotel prices in 
Washington D.C. on March 4th and the continuation of National Guard presence in the city 
(Cohen & Kaufman, 2021; “IntelBrief,” 2021). However, many QAnon leaders did begin to 
backpedal on the March 4th significance, claiming it was Antifa propaganda to “make the 
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inciting violence and QAnon leaders may feel the legitimacy of the movement is under 
pressure after several false predictions (Greenspan, 2021). Thus, by shifting blame, QAnon 
followers gain an opportunity to “waive responsibility,” if the prediction does not come true 
(Greenspan, 2021). While it is more important to gather intel and thwart individuals from 
attacks rather than focusing on specific dates (Rogers, 2021), it is This is unique to have such 
an in the senssuch an e that this level of ideological overlap. The connection to far-right 
conspiracy and sovereign citizens beliefs is largely unprecedented and further highlights how 
QAnon has been able to warp many lines of radical thinking under its umbrella.  
 
Tools for Spreading Disinformation 
The authors argue that social media is a double-edged sword partly because the low 
barriers for entry are often manipulated by violent extremist groups and non-state actors to 
propagate their message to larger crowds. While messages of misinformation and 
disinformation both seemingly spread fast, it is noteworthy to emphasize the variances 
between the two terms. Misinformation is simply the sharing of any non-factual information 
without necessarily doing so purposefully or with an intent to influence one's thoughts, 
beliefs, and behaviors (Hameleers et al., 2020; Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Schiffrin & 
Goodman, 2019, p.4). Disinformation is the intentional sharing of biased, misleading, or 
manipulative information, oftentimes in the form of propaganda (Hameleers et al., 2020; 
Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Schiffrin & Goodman, 2019, p.4). 
Individuals who are trying to recruit towards a cause to grow a network and 
indoctrinate new followers with propaganda videos, fringe websites, and other sources may 
intentionally engage in these acts and spread disinformation. Some individuals following the 
conspiracies passively can also spread misinformation. Much of the propaganda seen on 
fringe websites and alternative social media regarding QAnon is deliberate disinformation 
sharing. However, the internet and social media creates an extremely easy environment for 
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A 2018 study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology revealed that “falsehood 
diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper and more broadly” than truth on Twitter, 
especially regarding political news (Vosoughi et al., 2018, p.359). Further, social media has 
become a main outlet for users to receive news in real time; however, the contemporary media 
ecosystem can also amplify the reach of conspiracy theories and disinformation (Innes, 2020). 
Misinformation and/or disinformation often circulates quicker online and has a greater reach 
than verified information (Innes, 2020; Vosoughi et al., 2018). 
In relation to conspiracy-based radicalization, conspiracies that have the potential to 
indoctrinate and radicalize individuals can often be presented to encourage a higher level of 
engagement than factual information online. With public trust in news stations and institutions 
declining as polarization rises, online users may be even more susceptible to accepting digital 
disinformation from alternative sources. Thus, it is important to consider how disinformation 
can have similar effects as intentional propaganda in terms of the intended political 
consequences (Hameleers et al., 2020). With QAnon’s narrative deliberately attempting to 
discredit the current democratic institutions and leaders, the authors of this study argue that 
disinformation online would manifest as propaganda similar to that used by terrorist 
organizations, increasing the rate of conspiracy-based radicalization, while delegitimizing the 
current United States democratic institutions. Referring to the research question of which 
mechanisms have enabled QAnon to evolve so rapidly, the authors conclude that the 
intersection of social media and the rampant disinformation it allows for has been a large, if 




The authors utilized two methods to collect and analyze information online. Open-Source 
Intelligence techniques (OSINT) remained at the forefront as the authors gathered intelligence 
from publicly available sources where dialogues about QAnon were rampant. Since many 
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two main alternative platforms for data collection: Telegram and Gab. Telegram channels 
dedicated to QAnon were largely found through the general search bar and then through 
snowball techniques. The authors used the keywords “QAnon,” “Q,” and “WWG1WGA,” to 
find initial QAnon Telegram channels (“WWG1WGA” refers to a popular QAnon phrase 
“Where we go one, we go all”). Channels were often linked to several other QAnon related 
channels through content sharing or they would put other channel usernames in their bio lines 
to help build followings. In total, 35 QAnon-focused Telegram channels were analyzed in this 
report. While there are many more available, this sample collectively analyzed Telegram 
channels with regional focuses from all around the globe. The authors collected channel 
creation date, number of subscribers, and country affiliation. The number of subscribers to the 
channel was initially recorded on October 19th, 2020, with a follow up on November 26th, 
2020. For the 19 channels that were found to have an international presence, subscriber size 
was also recorded again on February 19, 2021, to analyze potential growth after the 
inauguration of President Biden.  
The same search and snowball techniques were utilized to build a database of Gab 
profiles. Using the search bar and the keyword “QAnon,” the authors found and tracked 21 
Gab accounts and groups. The authors collected similar open-source data from Gab and 
included group name, follower base size, country source information, as well as the creation 
dates for groups. No personal information pertaining to individual users was collected from 
any of the platforms, including names, usernames, IP addresses, or other information that 
could be used to identify online users.  
Several pieces of data collected from the OSINT techniques were able to be used in an 
algorithmic disinformation platform known as Storyzy. Storyzy is a France-based company 
that commercializes a SaaS (software-as-a-service) tool designed to alert and educate authors 
and analysts of disinformation platforms online. The Storyzy tool offers source analysis, topic 
analysis, chronology, country analysis, and social media analysis tools of disinformation sites, 
blogs, articles, and topics. The authors in this report were able to input topic keywords, such 
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trusted and disinformation—regarding the topic. While Storyzy has a range of source 
classifications, including “Think Tank, NGO, Academic, Association, Government, IGO, 
Political Party, Religious, Uncategorized, and Neutral,” the two main categories analyzed in 
this report were “Trusted” and “Disinformation.” Disinformation is broken down further into 
subcategories to better understand what topics each source may often be reporting 
misinformation or disinformation on. These subcategories include “Clickbait, Conspiracy, 
Extreme left, Extreme right, False information, Hate, Propaganda, Pseudoscience, Satire, and 
Tabloid” content. While Storyzy may classify some well-known sources as disinformation, it 
does not necessarily mean that every piece of information reported by that source is 
mis/disinformation, but there is evidence found by Storyzy of strong patterns of bias and/or 
misinformation occurring. 
This analysis tool also shared source locations for all articles relating to QAnon. The 
source location is critical when considering the global impact of the conspiracy following. 
The Storyzy platform was also critical in determining source ecosystems and networks of 
sources sharing these narratives. The platform analyzed which articles, both information and 
disinformation, were cited by other articles. It was used in this study to analyze both outbound 
and inbound links from popular blogs and sites regarding QAnon, helping to identify which 
sites are most critical and influential in spreading disinformation to QAnon followers around 
the globe. Storyzy was also used to determine patterns of publication volume relating to 
QAnon over time, as the platform is able to analyze thousands of sources to compile the 
number of articles relating to any one topic for any period of time.  
The final piece of this report was to ask real QAnon followers about their beliefs. 
Using the groups and accounts from Telegram and Gab, the authors utilized retrospective and 
longitudinal online in-app survey questions to gain insights into QAnon followers’ beliefs. 
Since each application functions in very different manners, two different styles of questions 
were presented to determine which methods may be best for future studies to collect more 
insights from QAnon followers. A five-question survey was created using Typeform, and the 
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Great Awakening.” At the time, these two groups had 31.4k and 47.7k followers, respectively, 
and both allow for moderated content to be shared by any followers. The survey questions 
included both multiple choice and short answers and had an estimated completion time of less 
than five minutes according to the Typeform analysis. The five questions were as follows: 
 
1. How long have you followed Q? 
2. What is the most important truth Q has shared since starting drops? 
3. Do you have friends and family who follow Q? 
4. What convinced you Q knew the truth? 
5. What intel motivates you the most to protest/take action offline? 
 
Telegram users were polled in a slightly different manner, as Telegram has an in-app 
poll feature already built in. Users can simply create a one question poll with multiple answer 
choices. Users can choose if there is a correct answer or if the poll is open ended, as well as 
decide if the polltakers have the choice to select one or more options. In this case, the authors 
allowed users to choose more than one option to best elucidate which of the many pillars of 
QAnon are important to them. The question posed included, “what pillars of QAnon drew 
respondents in?” The answer choices included: exposing the Democrats, keeping former 
President Trump in power, save the children, 2020 U.S. election, and the coronavirus control 
tactics. The Telegram poll requires that the creator input the response choices. These 5 
responses were chosen based on prior research and initial content analysis of Telegram 
channels. The authors reviewed prior research on violent incidents by QAnon followers (see 
Appendix A for complete list) and found that many perpetrators were conducting kidnappings 
or other violence when they thought children were in danger, hence the “save the children” 
option. Other perpetrators believed that the deep state was attempting to control civilians or 
that Democrats were the key perpetrators of child exploitation and other major crimes, hence 
the “expose the Democrats option.” Many of the Q drops were centered around former 
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focused on the 2020 Presidential election, leading to the “keeping President Trump in power” 
and “2020 U.S. election options.” The authors also found that within the Telegram channels, 
there was an abundance of pseudoscience and conspiracies related to the COVID-19 
pandemic and vaccine and therefore chose to include this as a choice option to gauge the 
intersection of pseudoscience and the QAnon ideology. The poll was posted in a prominent 
English-speaking QAnon group with 7,073 members that on average receives over 1,000 
messages a day. The participation was considerably greater on this poll, with 53 Telegram 
users willingly responding to the poll.  
 
Limitations and Ethical Considerations  
 
Small N 
The Gab survey portion highlights one of the limitations in this report, as many users 
were not willing to discuss their views with a user who they were not already affiliated with 
and did not trust. The post with the survey link received nine comments of QAnon followers 
who expressed their disagreement or distaste with attempts to collect any information about 
their beliefs. In total, only 11 out of the 31.4k and 47.7k followers began the survey, with 7 
completing. This resulted in a 63.6% completion rate with an average completion time of 4 
minutes and 9 seconds. This highlights an under coverage bias due to non-responsiveness, 
leading to a small N. This small sample size leads to a much higher variability and potential 
bias in the overall findings of this research. Those QAnon followers who did answer the 
survey may have had different answers than the respondents or different than the options that 
were available on the Telegram poll. However, the research did reveal the level of hesitation 
and suspicion towards outgroup members which foreshadows implications for future studies.  
 
Reporting Bias 
When interpreting survey responses, there is potential for reporting bias by seeking 
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results, the authors summarized and reported all 7 answers for each of the five survey 
questions to give a full understanding of the complexity of the QAnon conspiracy, as well as 
to reflect the answers from the already small N. The authors also disclosed negative findings, 
such as those QAnon channels that shrunk in follower size over the course of this research 
and potential bias of the Storyzy tool when discussing global findings. With the company 
being based in France, their database may have more disinformation sources from France 
compared to sources from other countries, skewing the findings for activity from links with 
French origins. This potential bias is displayed in Figure 15.  
 
Privacy, Anonymity, and Confidentiality 
Even though the authors did not have access to an Institutional Review Board (IRB), 
they remained committed to ensuring that the largest three ethical concerns of privacy, 
confidentiality, and anonymity were maintained (Sugiura, Wiles, & Pope, 2016). Firstly, the 
authors did not collect any data on identifying factors of respondents. The poll posted to Gab 
was completely anonymous and the authors had no way of knowing who was responding to 
the questions. Similarly, the poll posted on the Telegram channel was anonymous with the 
results only showing a statistical breakdown of the response choices. While this report does 
name large Telegram channels and Gab groups, these spaces are considered public Telegram 
channels that are easily searchable and retrievable. By not collecting username or respondent 
data, choosing the survey settings to remain anonymous, and only accessing public spaces, the 
authors ensured that participant information was protected.  
Other safeguards that ensured a degree of protection for participants included (1) 
refraining from asking any questions or protracting dialogues and engagements that could 
have potentially incriminated any of the respondents to ensure no legal issues or implications 
of entrapment and (2) only engaging in short-term passive measures to focus on information 
critical for the study to avoid interfering with any law enforcement activities online (Markham 
& Buchanan, 2012; UNODC, 2012; BPS, 2014). The questions were all formulated to acquire 
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conspiracy narrative, while refraining from questions about specific behaviors offline, 
intentions to act, or past crimes. The authors aimed to better understand the ideology as a 
whole, rather than any particular individuals’ behaviors and intentions, as the goal of the 
report was not to target any particular followers for their engagement for any 
reporting/intelligence purposes. Participants and all exposed to the questions were only 
contacted once on each platform in order to remain covert and non-intrusive. 
 
Open Source Intelligence and Data Collection 
The online environment presents unique access capabilities as well as challenges when 
conducting research on human subjects and there is not yet a clear consensus on ethical 
protocols for collecting and reporting on these spaces as the internet continues to develop 
rapidly (Innes, 2020; Webb et al., 2016). The data collected regarding channel name, channel 
size, source country and other descriptive information can be considered open-source 
intelligence (Pastor-Galindo et al., 2020). While generally used to unveil cybercrimes and aid 
cyberdefense, OSINT is also applicable to online social networks to gauge sentiment analysis 
and social opinion (Pastor-Galindo et al., 2020). While guidelines for OSINT research are still 
developing, the authors of this study ensured respect for user privacy by implementing the 
previously mentioned safeguards. Further, the collection of this data was covert and 
unobtrusive to not disrupt the natural sentiments and behaviors of users.  
In regard to the survey results, the authors also chose to remain covert and post from a 
pseudonym for two main reasons. By announcing their presence as researchers, the authors 
felt this would have significantly influenced the natural behaviors of the group and hindered 
the response rate if perceived as an outsider to the group (Sullivan, 1959, Oliver & Eales, 
2008, Roulet & Stenger, 2014 from Roulet et al., 2016). Similar to Langer & Beckman’s 
(2005) defense of covert research, the authors relied on unobtrusive efforts to analyze how 
QAnon narrative manifests on the individual level without stirring up emotions or posts in 
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Further, the environments that were analyzed are particularly hostile and suspicious of 
out-group members, a trait that is considerably different from most research subjects. The 
decision to collect data covertly also ensured protections to the researchers’ identity 
(Markham & Buchanan, 2012). While there is debate over the ethics and standards for data 
collection on digital spaces, the authors relied on previous works and the Association of 
Internet Researchers guidelines on easily retrievable public domains and other works on 
covert research of hostile public spaces to guide this research, while also prioritizing respect 
and no harm guidelines to participants (Kitchin, 2003; Langer & Beckman, 2005; Roulet et 
al., 2016; Sugiura, Wiles, & Pope, 2016). This decision to operate covertly does lead to a 
potential for reporting bias, as respondents may have answered differently than they would 
have in a research setting, which should be taken into consideration when assessing the 
findings of this report. The authors sought to balance respect and safety for participants, as 




The Flow of Disinformation 
Analysis of the QAnon Telegram channels led the authors to several outbound links 
where QAnon drops are aggregated, one of which being the “qalerts.app” site. The relation 
between this site and Telegram channels details how the flow of QAnon information is 
mobilized. “Q” drops “intel” to one of seven 4chan or 8kun message boards. According to the 
qalerts.app site, these message boards are titled “Project D Comms,” “Q Research,” “Patriots 
Fight,” “Great Awakening,” “The Storm,” “Calm Before the Storm,” and “4chan POL.” Many 
of the most recent postings have been on the “Q Research” board on 8kun. 
Figure 3 shows an example of how QAnon information can flow from the original 
intel drop down to individual followers. The new drop, which usually gets published on “Q 
Research” on 8kun, gets reposted on sites like Qalerts.app, which will send out text 
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subscribe to notifications to be sent to their phones or computers immediately after a new “Q 
drop” is posted. The alerts are available for iOS, Android, Windows, Mac, and Linux users. 
This alert system is one of the factors that influences how quickly the “Q drops” are now 
shared across hundreds of other messaging boards and apps.  
Two other sites, “QAgg.news” and “QAnon.pub,” both similar to “Qalerts.app,” are 
also popular aggregates for QAnon intel drops. As QAnon followers are notified of the new 
intel, the “Q drop” gets reposted to QAnon related groups on a plethora of social media 
including Telegram, Gab, and Bitchute, which then allow for discussion. While sites like 
Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, Twitter, and YouTube previously played a role in the flow of 
disinformation, these platforms have recently enforced strict removal policies for QAnon 
content. Therefore, these sites have become less influential in the flow of QAnon intel and are 
greyed out in the flowchart in Figure 3. These social media users often link back to the 
original sources on 8kun where more discussions can be found.  
It is also important to consider the influence that individual websites and blogs, as well 
as disinformation news sources, have in the flow of disinformation. These sites and blogs are 
often linked on pages like Qalerts.app and in social media channels for followers seeking 
more propaganda. It is at these levels of the flowchart where potential new conspiracy 
theorists can be truly indoctrinated by the plethora of echo chambers and propaganda on 
social media platforms and websites, which are all heavily interconnected. The unprecedented 
speed at which QAnon has grown and spread masses of disinformation globally can largely be 
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Figure 3. A simplified flowchart representing the spread of disinformation after a “Q 
drop” is made to an 8kun or 4chan board.  
 
Source: Authors.  
 
Growing Spread of Disinformation 
Findings also support previous literature contending that the growth of QAnon 
dramatically increased during the summer months of 2020. This increase is particularly 
visible when considering the number of news and research articles being released regarding 
QAnon over the last few years. There is a large disparity when comparing the volume of 
articles, both from trusted and disinformation sources, regarding QAnon in the months before 
and after March 2020.  
Figure 4 shows that from July 1st, 2019, to March 1, 2020, there were 4,207 articles 
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even split between trusted and disinformation sources, with 1,964 articles being from trusted 
sources, 2,006 articles from disinformation sources, and 237 articles not categorized. 
However, this number drastically increased during the summer months of 2020.  
Figure 5 shows that from March 1st, 2020, to November 1st, 2020, a total of 39,692 
articles were released regarding QAnon (note that the Y-axis is drastically larger in Figure 5 
compared to Figure 4 to show the increase in publications). This is an 843.4% increase in 
articles discussing QAnon compared to the eight-month period prior. Article releases during 
March through the early months of July remained fairly low, generally producing less than 
100 articles per day. However, on July 22nd, the first spike in QAnon information began, with 
830 articles being published discussing QAnon. This spike came directly after Twitter 
announced its removal of thousands of QAnon-related accounts on July 21st, 2020 (Allyn, 
2020). Since July 2020, the interest in covering QAnon from a trusted information source, as 
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Figure 5. Number of articles published about QAnon from March 1st, 2020, to 





While the overall volume of sources shows a significant jump in the public and media 
awareness of QAnon, understanding the trends that enable the spread of disinformation is 
critical to suppress its reach. Since the first QAnon drop, disinformation had spread at a 
considerably steady rate until the early months of 2020. According to Storyzy data platform, 
there have been 17,152 disinformation articles shared regarding QAnon since October 28th, 
2017, to November 1, 2020 (Figure 6). However, 8,032 of those articles have been released 
since March 1, 2020 (per Figure 5). This is nearly half (46.8%) of all the disinformation 
articles on QAnon being disseminated in the past eight months, despite QAnon existing for 
over three years at the time of this report. This is an alarming jump in the creation and spread 
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Figure 6. Volume of QAnon disinformation articles published by disinformation sources 






Several well-known disinformation sources have been at the forefront of this surge. 
The type of disinformation spread by QAnon is categorized as fabricated content, meant to 
deceive people entirely with the aim of creating mistrust in the government. The top 10 most 
cited sources featuring QAnon are online news hubs that have been most frequently quoted or 
used as a source for another article. While some of the links citing these sources are 
trustworthy and include factual information about the source itself, most often other 
disinformation hubs are using the fake information to further propagate the spread of 
falsehoods. The network of disinformation sources is well interconnected and includes 
sources both U.S.-based and abroad. Figure 7, which shows the “10 most cited disinformation 
sources about QAnon,” (between March 1, 2020, and November 1, 2020), serves to illustrate 
that Russian based rt.com has been cited 219 times in regard to QAnon information. Storyzy 
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disseminated. Further, Daily Caller is a right-wing U.S. based news source, which is classified 
as a “False Information” disinformation source by the Storyzy analysis platform. 
Dailycaller.com has been linked 194 times by other articles between March 1, 2020, and 
November 1, 2020. While the Daily Caller is a well-known and sought out news source, the 
classification may stem from right-wing bias which could perpetuate the spread of 
misinformation, especially when reporting on the QAnon conspiracy theory. 
The remaining 8 sources host an interesting range of disinformation. Five of the 
sources - westernjournal.com, the gatewaypundit.com, breitbart.com, pjmedia.com, and the 
federalist.com - are extreme right sources. While extreme right sources remain key 
influencers in the spread of QAnon disinformation, zerohedge.com is a pseudoscience and 
conspiracy source that has many recent articles discussing COVID-19 conspiracies. This 
reasserts the ability for QAnon to peak interest of new followers by relating to other existing 
lines of extreme and conspiracy thinking. Rightwingwatch.com is classified as a far-left 
source and is heavily connected to the QAnon disinformation spread from a left-leaning point 
of view. The range of classifications suggests that there is an abundance of falsehoods 
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Figure 7. Top 10 most cited disinformation sources about QAnon from March 1, 2020, 





These top 10 cited sources have a great influence on a much larger web of 
disinformation sources. Figure 8 displays the network analysis of 9,920 articles published 
about QAnon from March 1, 2020, to November 1, 2020. The green nodes represent 
trustworthy news sources, while the red nodes represent disinformation sources as classified 
by Storyzy. The color of the edge is based on the article source since disinformation sources 
were cited by trustworthy sources and trustworthy sources were cited by disinformation 
sources. While the web is largely made up of trustworthy sources and connections, there is a 
significant red to red connectivity, which is extracted on the image on the left. The network 
consists of the most recent 4,985 disinformation articles. The denser red nodes include many 
of the news sources in the Top 10 Most Cited Sources List in Figure 7. The social network 
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online. While red nodes with no connected edges are news sources with no shared links 
(inbound or outbound) to other sources in the database, most of the disinformation sources are 
connected to each other, sharing information and propaganda.  
While YouTube began removing QAnon content from its site in October 2020, it is 
necessary to stress the powerful influence that propaganda videos had during the early risings 
of QAnon as well (Ortutay, 2020). A study by Hameleers et al. (2020) found that multimodal 
disinformation, such as videos and images, can be perceived as more credible than simple 
textual disinformation. This finding supports our evidence that videos had a large impact on 
the vast conspiracy-based indoctrination QAnon was able to achieve. While articles about 
QAnon were being produced by trusted sources at greater rates than disinformation sources, 
the same trend does not hold true when it comes to video sources. Between March 1st, 2020, 
and November 1st, 2020, 4,422 videos were produced on YouTube regarding QAnon. Only 
1.96% (87) of those videos were generated from trusted sources, while disinformation videos 
received more 37 million views across 4,335 videos in the 8 month period. While most 
YouTube channels and videos related to QAnon have been taken down, the influence of 
YouTube and other video platforms, such as Bitchute, must be considered when attempting to 
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Figure 8. Left image: social network analysis (SNA) of the 9,920 most recent articles 
from March 1, 2020, to November 1, 2020, including both trustworthy and 
disinformation sources. Right Image: SNA of 4,422 most recent disinformation sources 





To visualize the connectivity further, Figure 9 shows a portion of the disinformation 
network closer. Three of the sites mentioned on the top 10 Most Cited Sources List are found 
at the top of the network: thegatewaypundit.com, rightwingwatch.org, and 
westernjournal.com. These larger nodes with several bidirectional edges illustrate the plethora 
of sources that they can influence. Further, the image highlights the range of other 
disinformation sources, including independent websites, personal blogs, and other 
disinformation news hubs. The vastness of disinformation simply related to QAnon is a 
significant threat to the legitimacy of news and democratic institutions that are attempting to 
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Gab Survey Results 
In addition to collecting data on QAnon disinformation sources, the authors attempted 
to seek answers from QAnon followers themselves through two different social media 
platforms. The survey sent out on Gab was the most formal survey method; however, 
engagement with the survey was extremely low. The survey only received 7 total responses 
from members of the two largest QAnon groups on Gab. While this sample cannot necessarily 
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begin building a picture of how QAnon followers engage with “Q.” All 7 of the responses to 
each question were summarized to maintain the full range of beliefs that QAnon propagates.  
 
Question 1. How long have you followed Q? 
Users shared a range of answers when asked how long they have been following 
QAnon. The answers included: “since the beginning; 3 years; on and off for about 3 years; 2 
years; 1 year; 8 months; and 6 months. This does suggest that while many QAnon believers 
have followed the conspiracy for quite some time, new users are still being indoctrinated 
within recent months.  
 
Question 2. What is the most important truth Q has shared since starting drops? 
The second question asked users what the most important truth “Q” has shared since 
starting drops. This question was designed to seek insights into whether there were any 
discernible patterns in regard to what QAnon pillars drew new followers in. Two users 
pointed to frustrations over “corruption in the government,” while two users stated that it is 
“the rampant paedophilia” and “widespread paedophilia” of elites that has been the most 
important pillar of QAnon. It is not surprising that this belief that the Democrats are taking 
part in a range of child sex trafficking rings can draw individuals to the QAnon following. At 
the core, it is a morally-just cause. However, the particular claims made by “Q” are baseless 
and suggest harm that cannot be supported by evidence. Many people have been influenced 
by the “save the children” movement of QAnon, indirectly encouraging criminal behavior and 
violence among adherents. These examples are discussed in depth in the Appendix A of this 
report. 
The final three answers to this question were a bit more conspicuous. They included 
“trust the plan,” “we’ve got it all,” and “the day of the rope is coming for the wicked.” These 
answers elucidate such a deep indoctrination into this belief system, but also point to lack of 
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“Q’s” predictions never actually coming to fruition, followers still believe “Q drops” are part 
of a larger ambiguous plan to overhaul the current governing institutions.  
 
Question 3. Do you have friends and family who follow Q? 
There was a 4-3 split to the question regarding whether family and friends also follow 
QAnon, with four users answering yes. While this is no significant percentage or sample, 
further research may consider how family dynamics, friendships, and social networks are also 
influencing the spread of this particular conspiracy (Goldenberg, et al., 2020). Being 
immersed in a community offline that is also perpetuating conspiracy-based radicalization can 
create further instances of group polarization and groupthink. 
 
Question 4. What convinced you Q knew the truth? 
The fourth question asked users what convinced them that “Q” knew the truth. This 
question, despite only 7 answers provided, revealed initial insights into just how important the 
mass of disinformation sources online is to this movement. While four of the answers were 
similar to those of question 2 and were conspicuous, three pointed to actual sources that 
helped users become indoctrinated. These sources included “Revolution Q,” a book written by 
NeonRevolt; the “Proofs,” a series of images and videos that attempt to draw connections 
between “Q drops'' and communications (often Tweets) from former President Trump to 
explain QAnon’s legitimacy; and “research and critical thinking skills... which invites one to 
research and use critical thinking.” New potential QAnon followers are being encouraged to 
“do their own research” and “find their own enlightenment.” This is an interesting finding, as 
many people are claiming this is how they have been awakened by QAnon.  
This pattern of thinking was elucidated initially after posting the survey link to the 
Gab page as well. Many QAnon followers commented on the post sharing their disagreement 
and suspicion of the questions, which is a potential factor for the low response rate to this 
survey. The major theme of the comments received was that individuals needed to do their 
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total comments, one tagging the page admin, and three simply saying no to the survey. The 
other 4 told the authors to go read through “Q’s” posts since the beginning, read through the 
boards, and form our own opinions about QAnon. While these users may not have actually 
opened the survey, their comments did reveal that QAnon has long encouraged new followers 
to read all of the drops from the beginning. “Q” has directly posted to followers “Think for 
yourself. Research for yourself. Trust yourself (“Research Resources,” n.d.).”  
The “Qalerts” site has a page titled “Research Resources,” where users can browse a 
network of 49 other sites and 24 video content and social media profiles to “enlighten” 
themselves (“Research Resources,” n.d.). Many of the sites listed simply reshare QAnon 
drops. However, some of the sites seek to legitimize QAnon further by providing “proofs,” 
which formulate supposed evidence proving that “Q” was communicating with former 
President Trump. Adherents believe that QProofs are “subtle connections between QAnon 
posts and actions or events involving former President Trump (“A Small Sampling of 
QProofs,” n.d.).” These “coincidences” are set up to validate QAnon as a legitimate insider 
source working closely with former President Trump, whilst allowing all involved to retain 
plausible deniability (“A Small Sampling of QProofs,” n.d.).” Adherents believe that 
oftentimes “Q” and former President [Trump] will coordinate the times of their online posts to 
share a deeper encrypted message (“Q/POTUS Deltas,” n.d.). This type of timing is known as 
a “delta” to followers and is a calculation of the time between a “Q drop” and a POTUS tweet. 
Further, the Q Proofs are often in the form of YouTube videos or images, which as a 
multimodal form of disinformation can increase the likelihood that viewers find the 
information credible. One adherent has published a 2-hour long video with 17 of the most 
important coincidences, titled “Ultimate QProofs- Volume 1.” The video had over 217k views 
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Figure 10. An example of a QProof from the “Ultimate QProofs-Volume 1” video on 
YouTube.  
 
Source: “Ultimate QProofs-Volume 1,” YouTube. 
 
While having the freedom to research beliefs and form individual opinions is certainly 
a pillar of any functioning democracy, users are being exposed to resources that are largely 
biased and sharing false information. The information users receive, such as the QProofs, 
prime users in a way to only come to one conclusion- that QAnon is legitimate, truthful, and 
working directly with former President Trump to take down the cabal of deep state politicians 
in power.  
 
Question 5. What intel motivates you the most to protest/take action offline? 
The final question asked users what intel would motivate them to protest/take action 
offline. This question was formulated to understand if most users were indoctrinated enough 
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The answers were similar to the first question and pointed to a range of the pillars that QAnon 
has long shared disinformation about. Answers included “violence, corruption, and abuse of 
children,” “the knowledge that we the people hold the real power,” “any intel that correctly 
identifies and exposes the enemy amongst us,” and “save the children.” While these answers 
point to a range of information being enough to potentially motivate individuals to take action 
offline, two other answers revealed that followers have long been preparing for some type of 
engagement and unrest. Whether that is related to “day of the rope,” or another type of clash, 
remains unclear, but QAnon followers continue to share beliefs that if there is a time for an 
overhaul of the government system, it is now. The danger with these beliefs is that if one 
person were to take action, groupthink dynamics could encourage and escalate others to do 
the same.  
 
Telegram Survey Results 
Telegram provided the most revealing information regarding the true breadth of 
influence that QAnon has had across the United States and internationally. The authors were 
able to track the change in follower size across 32 of the Telegram channels over a 39-day 
period. On October 19, 2020, across the 32 channels tracked, there were a total of 292,272 
followers of just these QAnon-related channels. On November 26, 2020, that number had 
risen to 340,761 total followers. This is a 17% increase in aggregate channel followings in just 
over a 5-week period. In fact, the “Qlobal-Change” channel, one of the largest international 
hubs on Telegram, gained 10,698 in a little over a month. Further, only three channels 
actually lost followers, though not by any large numbers. The channels lost 2, 9, and 25 
followers, respectively, and each of these channels were less active than many of the other 
channels in the dataset. While some followers could certainly be following more than one 
channel tracked in this report, the increase still presents accurate counts of individual users 
being exposed to new or additional QAnon content. This positive change in size suggests that 
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The survey used on Telegram also provided a much higher engagement than the 
attempts to engage with followers on Gab. In total, 53 users responded to the one question 
poll asking which Pillars of QAnon drew them in. The total percentage is greater than 100% 
since participants could select more than one option (Figure 11). This gave a better idea of the 
multiplicity that is the QAnon conspiracy and which of the many factors are driving 
individuals’ engagement. 
 
Figure 11. Breakdown of Telegram users’ beliefs on the most important QAnon pillars. 
 
Source: Authors.  
 
Forty seven percent of the respondents chose “save the children” as at least one of 
their responses. This is not a surprising result and begins to support the Gab results in which 
the “Save the Children” pillar was also talked about several times. This belief in widespread 
paedophilia continues to be one of the most engaging facets of QAnon and disproving this 
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“Keeping President Trump in Power” received 39% of users' votes. This points to an 
interesting dichotomy that exists between QAnon and the traditional nature of far-right 
movements. The far-right has generally opposed big government, however, the QAnon 
following is built upon growing the power and influence of who QAnon followers see as their 
true leader. The conspiracy appeals to millions of Americans who support former President 
Trump, even those who do so passively. With such a mass following, the conspiracy theory 
continues to attract new adherents and may continue to do so in the future. Those former 
President Trump supporters who repudiate the election results may be even more attracted to 
a conspiracy following that continues to provide hope for the candidate. Even though it 
received the smallest percentage of votes, 18% of participants did say that election fraud 
beliefs are influencing their draw to QAnon. With election fraud claims being a relatively 
recent event yet still having influence on building new QAnon support, there may be a spike 
in QAnon growth in the coming weeks and months. This finding supports previous research 
contending that feeling like an outsider in the democratic process can lead one to seek 
alternative information and communities to cope with unprecedented times and chaos. Many 
former President Trump supporters who are unhappy with the election results may accept 
these fraud claims and find QAnon to be supporting the results they wanted.  
Similarly, 37% of participants also selected “COVID as a control tactic” as a 
motivating factor that piqued their interest in QAnon. What is important to consider is how a 
conspiracy theory that was initiated in 2017, two years before the first COVID-19 case, has 
been able to manipulate current events to further their agenda. QAnon has long been able to 
draw in anti-vaxxers, and in the era of COVID-19, those who do not believe in mainstream 
science were easily manipulated by “Q’s” assertions that COVID is a government developed 
ploy to impose more controlling restrictions on citizens. It seems that due to QAnon’s facade 
as a government official, along with the wide range of types of people that it can appeal to, 
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Global Trends 
While Gab is known for hosting United States based far-right content, Telegram 
offered a particularly high sense of international influence. In the 35 channels analyzed, at 
least 11 countries had channels dedicated to the intersection of their nationality and QAnon-
related topics, many of which grew throughout the final months of 2020 and early 2021. 
These countries and regions included the United States, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany—
specifically the Bavaria region—France, Austria, Brazil, Argentina, and the United Kingdom. 
There were also several channels with large followings dedicated to an international crowd, 
including “Qlobal-Change.” A sample of 19 channels that have an international presence are 
illustrated in Table 1, which includes the audience target, the channel size as of November 
26th, 2020, with a near three-month follow up total recorded on February 19, 2021, and the 
channel creation date, if known.  
While many of the channels with the largest followings began in 2018 and 2019, some 
country specific channels, such as WWG1WGA!-Austria Chat, Deutschland/USA/NEWS, 
Digital Soldiers Germany Memes, Digital Soldiers Germany News, Qlobal-Change France, 
and Global-Change ARG, were created in the early months of 2020. This suggests that 
channels are still being created and generating interest from a range of countries around the 
globe. Of the 19 channels in Table 1, 15 of them grew from November 1, 2020, to February 
19, 2021, many of which by thousands of subscribers. Aside from the U.S.-focused “Qlobal-
Change USA,” the country specific channels that experienced the largest growth were 
“Qlobal-Change Italy” and “Frag uns doch,” a German channel. One smaller German and 
U.S.-centric channel “Deutschland/USA/NEWS” has since gone offline. The channels that 
experienced a decrease in subscribers were the UK, Austria, and Argentina focused, 
respectively. The drastic growth by several of the channels suggests sustained momentum 
even post-Trump’s presidency on a global scale. This is best seen by the example of the 
“Qlobal-Change.” On October 19th, 2020, the channel had certain countries, and underlying 
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discourse, more so than others, especially in countries that are seeing similar uprising of far-
right movements as the in United States. 
 











Qlobal-Change International 137,006 
subscribers 






















United Kingdom 788 members 765 June 5, 2019 
Qlobal-Change 
Espana 
Spain 1,763 subscribers 2,524 June 10, 2019 
Qlobal-Change 
Portugal 
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Frag uns doch Germany 37,614 
subscribers 




International 1,188 subscribers 1,257 October 1, 2019 
WWG1WGA.Gl
obal 
International 447 subscribers 662 February 4, 2020 
WWG1WGA!-
Austria Chat 
Austria 345 members 328 April 5, 2020 
Deutschland/US
A/NEWS 
Germany/USA 219 members Offline May 3, 2020 
Digital Soldiers 
Germany Memes 
Germany 2,757 subscribers 2,832 June 14, 2020 
Digital Soldiers 
Germany News 
Germany 4,859 subscribers 7,435 June 23, 2020 
QAnons USA- 
Dark to Light 
USA 1,985 subscribers 2,753 Unknown 
Digital Soldiers 
Germany 
Germany 3,487 subscribers 4,171 Unknown 
Qlobal-Change 
France 
France 279 subscribers 910 May 8, 2020 
Qlobal-Change 
Brasil 
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Qlobal-Change 
ARG 
Argentina 393 subscribers 375 May 21, 2020 
Source: Authors. 
 
Further, traffic into the “qanon.pub” page (a popular aggregator of all QAnon drops) 
and the “Q Research” 8kun thread also illustrates a large disparity when it comes to 
international traffic. “Qanon.pub” has received an average of 2.6 million views per month 
over the last 6 months. The graph of the traffic patterns in Figure 12 shows page views per 
month since January 2019. While there are certainly spikes in interest prior to 2020, activity 
and page traction began to increase leading up the 2020 Presidential election through October 
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Figure 12. Views per month of the qanon.pub webpage, averaging 2.6 million views from 




The geographic breakdown of the web traffic supports claims that while the United 
States is still the hub for QAnon interest and adherents, other countries are gaining an interest. 
Visitors by country data suggests that the United States accounts for just over three quarters 
(76.6%) of incoming traffic to the webpage. Roughly 6.5% of the routers could not be located 
and were categorized as other. Australia, Canada, Portugal, Greece, and South Africa also 
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There was also significant international presence when analyzing the source country of 
inbound links (articles and links that brought users to) the “QAnon.pub” site. The majority, or 
65.8%, of inbound links are coming from United States based sources. However, several other 
countries account for the remaining 34.2% of inbound links (Figure 14). It should be noted 
that these findings are an estimate on location sources with several variables that could 
influence this statistic. These variables include the fact that some users may be using VPN to 
protect or bounce their IP address, as well as cases met with privacy concerns, which explains 
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Standing at 13.4%, France made up a relatively large portion of incoming traffic. This 
is interesting since German followers make up the largest non-United States QAnon following 
(Dittrich, Grandjean, Jager & Rathje, 2020). This finding may be skewed by Storyzy being a 
French platform and having more French sources and information in its database compared to 
German sources. German sitemasters may also be declaring their sites in Panama or other 
false locations more frequently. However, from a larger perspective, this finding supports 
recent data by other studies that QAnon is catalyzing and drawing in followers by adapting 
EU-centric and local conspiracy theory beliefs, especially those related to COVID-19 (“Covid 
a 'catalyst',” 2020). In July of 2020, United States-based fake news monitor NewsGuard 
reported over 450,000 known QAnon followers in France, Italy, Germany, and Britain 
(“Covid a 'catalyst',” 2020). Analysis of 8kun traffic also showed evidence of global 
connectedness, with outbound and inbound links to several countries around the world (Figure 
15). However, there is a large discrepancy between U.S. directed inbound and outbound links 
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while incoming link traffic is from the United States only 47.3% of the time. This suggests 
that there are sources from all around the world bringing users to the 8kun message board; 
however, the message board often links users to new sources that are largely United States-
based and  continue to serve as a large piece of QAnon’s global growth. 
 
Figure 15. Inbound and outbound link origins of the 8kun “Q Research” board. 
Source: Storyzy. 
 
This analysis adds insights into those findings, illustrating that QAnon has also been 
able to influence conspiracy theorists from Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Egypt, 
Portugal, South Africa and many more. The conspiracy theory has been able to draw people in 
from all cultures, countries, religions, political beliefs, and walks of life like no other before. 
QAnon has shared “intel” on such a wide range of topics, creating opportunities for users 




This research underscores how the evolution of QAnon is unique from other conspiracy 
movements because it does not rest on one pillar or belief about a particular event. The fact 
that QAnon has shared “intel” on several different topics and events has allowed “Q” to warp 
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revealing “criminal activity” about prominent democrats appeals to those with right-wing 
views; intel regarding the COVID-19 pandemic appeals to anti-vaxxers and other lines of 
anti-science beliefs, while intel about potential voter fraud and deep-state activity often 
appeals to supporters of former President Donald Trump. However, this research revealed that 
the “save the children” movement is one of the more powerful sources of recruitment for 
QAnon, as it is morally just and can span interest across political ideologies and societal 
contexts.  
A major pillar of the conspiracy theory is that adherents view former President Trump 
as someone who is going to bring the change they want against a system they feel they have 
been excluded from. Following the conclusion of the Trump Administration, speculations can 
be made to further assess and predict the future movement of QAnon. Firstly, QAnon 
supporters are highly unsettled by the election results and seek stability now that former 
President Trump is no longer in office (Harwell, 2021). As previously illustrated, QAnon 
supporters not only idolized the former president, but they wanted to attain their vision of 
what America should look like under the administration. They are now seemingly “lost” 
without a sense of direction as they strive to combat their perceived enemies within the 
democratic party, including current President Biden. Upticks in violence are expected to 
occur, as QAnon supporters yearn to seek revenge for the election outcome. Following former 
President Trump’s departure, QAnon turned to social media to not only express their 
grievances, but to keep the notion of former President Trump alive. A QAnon channel on 
Telegram containing 40,000 users issued a post highlighting Trump’s farewell remarks: “We 
will be back in some form - Have a good life. We will see you soon” (Harwell, 2021). Many 
QAnon supporters are likely to continue to cling to these words until former President Trump 
resurfaces in some way or capacity. However, it is important to note a large divide in terms of 
the response to the administration swap. This can be illustrated by exploring the reaction of 
Ron Watkins, a long-time administrator of the social media platform heavily used by QAnon, 
8kun. Watkins posted on 8kun the following statement: “We need to keep our chins up and go 
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comment is unclear, spikes in violence and unrest are likely to occur in waves. Additionally, 
the geographic distribution of these cells is expected to remain decentralized, as some 
embrace change while others cling to their euphoric past.  
The perception of an enemy and unwillingness to accept alternative information is the 
mechanism by which QAnon adherents continue to be indoctrinated and, in some cases, 
inclined to act offline. The momentum of followers and legitimacy that QAnon has built has 
effectively inspired some to take legitimate offline action, proving to be a significant and 
growing VE threat. Analysis of news sources and previous studies revealed that there are at 
least 23 criminal and/or violent incidents that have been connected to QAnon beliefs since 
2017. These incidents have included threats against political and societal elite, as well as more 
severe crimes including several kidnappings and murder. With 10 of these incidents occurring 
in 2020, QAnon still inspires individuals to seek action offline. A summary of these incidents 
can be found in Appendix A. This report exemplifies the connection between groupthink and 
group polarization theory within the context of VE and conspiracy theories, highlighting the 
unprecedented need to understand conspiracy-based radicalization and P/CVE options. The 
influence that psychological factors such as inclusion and belonging have on conspiracy 
followers very suggests that psycho-social solutions are a key to combating QAnon and future 
conspiracy followings.  
In addition to continued VE threats, the most critical future implications of the 
continued growth of QAnon are a weakening of the democratic institutions on which the 
country is founded. As many conspiracy theories do, QAnon is rising during an uncertain and 
contested political time in the U.S. It is effectively weakening the legitimacy and trust that 
Americans have in politicians and democratic institutions. Many followers are advocating for 
actions that blatantly breach the U.S. Constitution and laws in order to propagate further 
power for former President Trump. Thus, QAnon has become a political weapon with real 
offline consequences. It is quickly escalating further than any other conspiracy theory, with a 
potential to influence political thought, discourse, and decision-making if QAnon-adherents 
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States politicians running for office whom have not only refused to condemn QAnon, but 
have explicitly expressed support for the conspiracy theory.   
While the future implications of QAnon will greatly affect the United States as a 
domestic movement, the international presence of QAnon should not be understated. As 
highlighted in this research, QAnon is currently building followers in countries all around the 
globe, many of which have drastically different political and societal environments. Much of 
the disinformation QAnon and QAnon-adherents discuss regarding COVID-19 and “save the 
children” can be understood outside of a uniquely domestic context. Further, individuals from 
countries with histories of corruption and current political tensions may be inclined to 
consider QAnon. This may be due to perceived shared grievances over exclusion and lack of 
belonging from one's government and by political leaders. Future studies must consider 
QAnon’s growth in individual countries to determine the unique driving causes that are 
recruiting and indoctrinating new followers.  
  In terms of research practicality, this research should be used as a starting point for 
future studies that seek insights from conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists themselves. 
The largest limitation of this research was the low response rate to the survey questions across 
styles and platforms. One factor for this may be due to QAnon encouraging individuals to 
seek their own research and enlightening, making individuals less willing to engage with an 
unknown user in their online social networks. Secondly, there are both active and passive 
social media users, which can also influence survey and dialogue engagement. While 
thousands of individuals are viewing QAnon related content, not all social media users are 
willing to actively engage online. Most importantly, however, is the level of suspicion that 
many alternative social media users feel about probing questions and new users. Telegram 
users were often suspicious of “feds” or spies on the platform, perhaps due to anxieties that 
the content and groups would be shut down. These suspicions stem from perceived bias in the 
mainstream media and research, as well as from law enforcement. Many respondents to the 
surveys in this report would question whether the work was to undermine their beliefs. While 
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many passive followers are refraining from public-facing dialogue over prospects of 
intelligence gathering or total shutdown. This also proves to be a motivator in refraining from 
communication with outgroup members.  
Due to the suspicions of QAnon supporters, future studies should not present long 
surveys, but use the tools that adherents are already familiar with, as well as attempt to build a 
stronger rapport with users in their online communities. Questions should be posed without 
any glimpse that authors may be attempting to insert a counternarrative to use the information 
“against” conspiracists. Telegram had the most feedback because it used the poll option that 
so many users were already familiar with. It ensured anonymity and was a simple, quick 
engagement rather than a continued and potentially probing dialogue. Further, the online 
platforms are strong echo chambers, with thousands of QAnon adherents prepared to defend 
“Q” and those they are familiar with in their online community. Perhaps, online surveys are 
not the most effective means to gather information about QAnon’s ability to recruit and 
indoctrinate, but rather in-person interviews may be more effective to bridge suspicions and 




Whether it is 8kun, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, or YouTube, the conspiracy-based 
movement will continue to grapple with constitutional edicts of free speech versus the 
potential harmful effects of disinformation. Deploying tools like artificial intelligence and 
fact-checker systems enhances the ability of platforms to be more consistent in weeding out 
disinformation. The authors recommend multimodal counternarrative efforts, such as videos 
and images, in addition to text based counternarratives, as these sources may be perceived as 
more credible and effective when combatting conspiracy-based disinformation online 
(Hameleers et al., 2020).  
Following the study by Hameleers et al. (2020), the authors of this report find that 
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online. They found that fact checker tools not only have the potential to counter 
disinformation, but they can overcome partisan and attitudinal filters, which are large facets of 
the QAnon conspiracy. While their research did contend that the effectiveness of these tools 
can depend on the topic of disinformation, it is worth initiating research on their potential 
effect on QAnon-based radicalization. Online users should normalize fact-checking tools to 
identify falsified information, images, and other media across social media and journalistic 
sites. While platforms such as Telegram and Gab are certainly presenting as echo-chambers of 
highly indoctrinated conspiracy-narratives, fact-checking and multimodal counter narratives 
may be able to force individuals to begin questioning alternative lines of thinking, lowering 
the threshold for disengagement to be successful. While it may not be possible to disengage 
the masses of QAnon followers, these tools may be effective at the individual level.  
In terms of fact checking and disputing disinformation online, both established 
credible journalists and public figures, as well as ordinary citizens, can be equally effective 
voices for intervention (Hameleers et al., 2020). Further, independent audits of algorithms can 
be shared by multiple governments that are seeking similar outcomes of accountability and 
transparency; governments, social media companies, and research institutions can rely on 
information sharing to create more holistic and comprehensive response plans. In addition, 
creating campaigns that strive to raise awareness, strengthen capacities, educate the public, 
and deter sympathizers from the pillars of QAnon is a critical first step in establishing validity 
and cause with the general public (Goldenberg et al., 2020). In order for them to consider 
supporting a disassociation and defamation approach as a public good, the audience needs to 
understand how they will benefit from this and what are the potential consequences if the 
network is not defeated. Although social media platforms are an easy way to spread false 
content and disinformation, it also has the potential to enhance democratic participation and 
decrease the digital divide within societies.  
P/CVE cannot always be reactionary in nature; however, it should also target the 
push/pull factors that increase an individual’s vulnerability to be radicalized in the first place. 
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their legitimacy and grip on society, allowing their reach to grow to exponential lengths. In 
order to combat conspiracy-based radicalization before it happens, the authors understand the 
need for a greater emphasis on “Media and Information Literacy (MIL)” in educational and 
developmental settings (Abu-Fadil, 2018). By understanding the psychological appeal behind 
QAnon, researchers will be able to discern techniques and strategies that could be used to 
dissuade future followers. Media and Information Literacy is a skill that is highly regarded by 
UNESCO in order to allow individuals the right of freedom of expression, right to seek, 
receive, and impact information and opinion, while ensuring all humans are able to 
understand how their beliefs may be impacted and shared by the information they are exposed 
to everyday (Abu-Fadil, 2018). Leveraging this framework as a disengagement and defection 
tool for those that are not fully radicalized can help minimize the growth and appeal of 
QAnon. Increased Media and Information Literacy allows individuals to build increased 
resiliency to disinformation and potential conspiracy-based radicalization (Abu-Fadil, 2018). 
The authors of this study highly suggest that MIL based learning modules become a core facet 
of U.S. national and local P/CVE efforts during this age of disinformation.  
A former member of QAnon, Jitarth Jadeja, recounted his experience and outlined 
why he decided to forgo future involvement. Jadeja’s initial interest in QAnon peaked in 2016 
when he began to watch Senator Bernie Sanders speak about anti-establishment sentiment and 
inequality (Lord, 2020). Following the Presidential Election of Donald Trump, Jadeja stated, 
“That kind of really kicked it all off for me” (Lord, 2020). He began listening to conspiracy 
theory podcasts and reading articles online that diverged from mainstream media. He claimed 
he was in a deep depression and relied on QAnon to foster a sense of hope and purpose for the 
future. He described the impact that QAnon had on him as very “nefarious” and “insidious” 
because of how slowly he became disconnected from reality (Lord, 2020). However, the 
motivating factor that caused him to doubt QAnon was the inconsistencies he found among 
promises and theories argued by QAnon members. For example, a QAnon member had 
allegedly asked former President Trump to use the words “tip top” in one of his speeches, 
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encourages others to dive deeper into what may have been a sheer coincidence. Jadeja 
claimed he started questioning everything that QAnon represented after realizing that former 
President Trump had used that exact phrase in the past (Lord, 2020). Leveraging 
inconsistencies among QAnon is an integral part in P/CVE efforts that practitioners can utilize 
when crafting disengagement strategies. This can serve as a starting point to dismantle the 




This report found that the plethora of disinformation sources coupled with easy access of the 
internet are the major catalysts that enabled the QAnon conspiracy to grow to an 
unprecedented threat level. This research emphasizes how the digital environment can create 
an abundance of disinformation, which presents a modern P/CVE threat of conspiracy-based 
radicalization. Efforts to disengage conspiracy-based extremists will largely have to take 
place online rather than in a physical setting, leading to numerous challenges. Firstly, it can be 
harder to connect with individuals and get them to perceive counternarratives as credible 
when presented in a digital environment that has already become an echo-chamber of 
disinformation. Secondly, the digital space presents a unique slippery slope of 
constitutionality versus security. Some researchers argue that online disinformation threatens 
democracy, while others argue that social media has the potential to enhance democratic 
participation, and that legal restrictions can curtail this opportunity.  
Being able to strike a balance between protecting free speech while limiting the 
influence of disinformation is key to slowing QAnon’s global spread. Conspiracy theories and 
disinformation are boundless and spread easily with great speed across social media 
platforms, therefore necessitating a collaborative effort that transcends all sectors of society. 
Governments, the private sector, and civil society actors can help counter the threat of QAnon 
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The future implications of QAnon are not simply based on removing all of its related 
content but finding avenues to effectively disengage adherents and discourage the spread of 
disinformation. While breaking cycles of conspiracy theorizing, as well as group polarization 
and groupthink, are difficult, literature has begun to delve into understanding the multitude of 
mechanisms that lead individuals towards conspiracies and potentially violence. The mass 
amounts of misinformation and disinformation in the U.S. have accumulated to what some 
consider to be a public health crisis that has led to unprecedented divides and that will take 
time to rebuild and unify (Horgan, 2021). Despite what constitutes an agreed upon legal 
definition of domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism, there appears to be 
reluctance in its application to right-wing extremism and conspiracy-based movements, such 
as QAnon. The conspiracy theory has evolved so much as to influence the actions and rhetoric 
of its followers to degrees similar to other violent extremist groups and terrorist organizations. 
Despite these similar traits, QAnon has not been formally classified as a domestic violent 
extremist movement or network. The discretionary use of labelling movements as VE and 
terrorism networks produces additional hindrances for law enforcement, practitioners, and 
social media companies to actively engage in defection and intervention efforts among 
extremist movements.  
While countering violent extremism efforts do not generally focus on conspiracy 
theories, QAnon is radicalizing in a way to promote political and ideological violence and 
thus must be a target for P/CVE efforts globally. These efforts must include an intersection of 
continued research on QAnon developments. These efforts must also focus on psycho-social 
approaches to understanding the psychological and societal components on conspiracy 
followings in order to deter engagement in the first place, education and resilience-building 
against disinformation, and partnerships with tech companies to effectively limit the spread of 
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Appendix A.  Timeline of Criminal Incidents and Violence Related to QAnon 
 
 
December 4, 2016- Washington D.C.- Edgar Welch, a North Carolina resident, drove to Washington 
D.C. and entered the Comet Ping Pong pizza shop armed with an AR-15. Believing that the pizza shop 
was housing a child sex ring in a basement, which the facility did not have, Welch shot off the lock to 
a door. Nobody was injured in the incident. Welch was immediately arrested and pleaded guilty to 
federal and local weapon charges in March of 2017. The incident is well-known as the “pizzagate” 
conspiracy (Williams, 2017). 
 
May 2018 & August 2019- Tucson, AZ- Michael Lewis Arthur Meyer, a known QAnon supporter, 
was charged in August of 2019 for stealing and damaging water tanks at Cemex plant, known for 
distributing water to migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. Meyer was previously on Tucson 
police radar for claiming he had discovered a bunker that was being used by child sex traffickers. The 
site, which had old clothes, a toilet seat, and a septic tank, was previously the site of a homeless camp 
(Wiles, 2018). 
 
June 15, 2018- Clark County, NV- QAnon supporter Matthew Wright blocked off a bridge near the 
Hoover Dam with his vehicle. The vehicle was found to have two military-grade rifles, two handguns, 
and 900 rounds of ammunition inside. A video recorded from inside the vehicle showed Wright 
claiming he was unhappy that mass arrests had not been made yet against the cabal of pedophiles Q 
had been exposing. Wright was found guilty of terrorism-related charges in February of 2020. He 
continued to write to former President Trump from prison, using QAnon related expressions 
frequently (Beckett, 2020). 
 
July 2018- Newport Beach, CA- Michael Avenatti, a high-profile lawyer who represented actress 
Stormy Daniels, was targeted by a QAnon drop in July 2018. The drop included images of a man 
outside of Avenatti’s office building, holding an unidentifiable object. The drop led to increased 
threats against Avenatti, and police were called to investigate the incident (Sommer, 2020).  
 
July 31, 2018- Berwick, PA- 55-year-old Jeffrey Gardner Boyd of Oklahoma was arrested for making 
terroristic threats to kill former President Trump, Ivanka Trump, Donald Trump Jr., and Jared 
Kushner. Boyd told a local woman he had driven to Pennsylvania that he was convinced a local 
woman who posts online about QAnon was being held hostage by the deep state. When he found the 
woman was not being held hostage, he told her he was planning to drive to Washington D.C. to shoot 
the former President and his family and that the CIA was controlling his mind. He was found in his 
truck with a gun and ammunition after the woman reported him to authorities (Sommer, 2018).  
 
December 19, 2018- Springfield, Ill- A California man was arrested after alleging he was going to 
‘blow up a satanic temple monument’ in Springfield, Illinois. According to an FBI Bulletin, the man 
had been found in possession of bomb making materials with the intent to construct an explosive 
device in his car after driving to Illinois. The report stated the intent was to “make Americans aware of 
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January 6, 2019- Seattle, WA- 26-year-old Proud Boy and QAnon supporter, Buckey Wolfe, 
murdered his brother with a sword. He told dispatch at the time that “God told me he was a lizard.” 
Wolfe was acquitted of charges due to an insanity plea (Sommer, 2019).  
 
January 23, 2019- Washington D.C.- Just over two years after Edgar Welch entered Comet Ping 
Pong armed with an AR-15, a California man set the same pizza shop on fire. Ryan Jaselskis, who was 
charged with the arson, had posted a video to his parents’ YouTube account one hour prior, spewing 
sentiments that “the world is run by a Satanic global pedophile ring fronted by most major celebrities 
and Hillary Clinton” (Kurzius, 2019). 
 
March 13, 2019- Staten Island, NY- 24-year-old Anthony Comello was charged with the murder of 
one of the leaders of the notorious Gambino crime family. Comello shot and killed Francesco Cali 
outside of his home. Court documents shared that Comello was at the time acting under QAnon 
delusions that people associated with organized crime were a part of the deep state (Allyn, 2019).  
 
May 9, 2019- Grass Valley, CA- A QProof theory became centered around the Grass Valley Charter 
School in California, leading to the shutdown of a major fundraiser event over security concerns. The 
theory assumed that FBI Director James Comey was going to stage a terrorist attack at the school's 
upcoming fundraising event. While the claim was outlandish, the school cancelled the event in case of 
attracting QAnon supporters to the event (“QAnon conspiracy theory on James Comey,” 2019).  
 
September 25, 2019- Sedona, AZ- A QAnon supporter, Timothy Larson, was arrested for 
vandalizing the Chapel of the Holy Hill while yelling claims that the church was supporting human 
trafficking (Beckett, 2020).  
 
December 30, 2019- Kalispell, MT- Colorado woman Cynthia Abcug, 50, was arrested and charged 
by Montana police with felony conspiracy to commit kidnapping after attempting to plot the 
kidnapping of her son from child-welfare services with support from other QAnon believers (Beckett, 
2020).  
 
March 26, 2020- Kentucky- A stark QAnon believer and sovereign citizen adherent, Neely 
Blanchard, was charged with the kidnapping of her two daughters, who are in their grandmothers’ full 
custody. She argued her beliefs gave her the legal right to her children (Beckett, 2020).  
 
April 2, 2020- Los Angeles, CA- The FBI charged train operator Eduardo Morena with purposefully 
derailing a freight train, which was traveling at high speeds, near a Navy hospital ship. Morena told 
investigators he believed the ship was being used in part for a “government takeover” (Blankstein, 
2020). 
 
April 30, 2020- New York, NY- An Illinois woman, Jessica Prim, drove to NYC while livestreaming 
on Facebook making threats against Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, and Tony Podesta. Prim had 
previously posted online about QAnon. She was found with 18 knives in her car as she approached the 
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June 11, 2020- Boston, MA- 29-year-old Apalus Slyman led police on a 20-mile police chase in 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire while livestreaming to Facebook rants about QAnon. His five 
children were also in the car during the incident (Salahi, 2020).  
 
July 3, 2020- Ottawa, CAN- A Canadian Ranger who had previously posted online about multiple 
conspiracy theories, including QAnon and the coronavirus, rammed his truck into the gates of 
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s residence. He was charged with 22 charges related to illegal 
firearm possessions (Cecco, 2020).  
 
August 12, 2020- Waco, TX- A 30-year-old woman, Cecilia Fulbright, intentionally chased down and 
crashed into a vehicle because she thought she was chasing a pedophile and rescuing a girl from being 
trafficked (Beckett, 2020).  
 
September 25, 2020- Oklahoma City, OK- Joshua Jennings was arrested and charged with 
murdering his girlfriend's 10-month-old baby. Jennings Facebook often shared posts with the 
#saveourchildren hashtag. (Greenspan, 2020). 
 
October 1, 2020- Salt Lake City, UT- Emily Jolley of Utah abducted her 6-year-old son from his 
father, who has sole custody. Jolley travelled to Oregon when she was arrested by authorities. Jolley 
was an avid adherent to QAnon and often posted on her social media (Beckett, 2020).  
 
October 16, 2020- Pittsburgh, PA- A USPS mail carrier, Sean Troesch, who had posted about 
QAnon is currently under investigation for allegedly throwing away bags of mail prior to the 2020 
U.S. Presidential Election (Greenspan, “A USPS worker,” 2020).  
 
November 5, 2020- Philadelphia, PA- Two Virginia men were arrested after driving a truck with 
fake ballots and two loaded handguns to the Pennsylvania Convention Center where election ballots 
were being counted. The QAnon followers said they were concerned over election fraud. Police also 
found an AR-style rifle and 160 rounds of ammunition. Two QAnon emblems and #WWG1WGA 
were visible on the truck the men were driving (Beer, 2020).  
 
January 6, 2021- Washington D.C.- On the day of the presidential election certification process 
following the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, rioters began breaching the security at the United States 
Capitol building. What is being called the Capitol Insurrection, it resulted in the death of 5 people, 
including a D.C. police officer. More than 260 people have since been charged with crimes related to 
the riots and attacks, many connected to anti-government, white supremacist, and QAnon movements 
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